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investments in its Weirton Steel division because a higher rate of profit could be made elsewhere. In the 
same press release the conglomerate suggested that the 11,000 employees of Weirton Steel buy the mill 
themselves. 
Unlike the steel mills that closed in Youngstown from 1977-1980, the Weirton mill was relatively modern 
and was making a profit (1% on 1981 sales of $1 billion). Continued operation of the facility made sense. 
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On March 2, 1982, the National Steel conglomerate announced 
that it would make no further investments in its Weirton Steel 
division because a higher rate of profit could be made elsewhere. 
In the same press release the conglomerate suggested that the 
11,000 employees of Weirton Steel buy the mill themselves. 
Unlike the steel mills that closed in Youngstown from 1977-1980, 
the Weirton mill was relatively modern and was making a profit 
(1% on 1981 sales of $1 billion). Continued operation of the facility 
made sense. 
National's desire to transfer ownership, rather than to close the 
mill stemmed not from any wish to help the workers and their 
families, but from the high costs of shutdown. A consultant for 
National estimated shutdown costs of $280 million made up of 
severance pay, operating losses, impact on upstream operations, 
and underabsorption of corporate overhead. After offsetting tax 
credits that could be claimed in the event of a shutdown, the 
consultant told National that its net loss from closing the mill 
would be $70 million. The consultant accordingly advised that 
a shutdown scenario was unattractive, and that a far better option 
for National was to sell the plant to employees and the community, 
"if they perceive that shutdown is the only alternative." 
The Wall Street Journal suggested other motivations for a 
company-sponsored buyout: 
• Staughton Lynd, a lawyer at Northeast Ohio Legal Services in Youngstown, Ohio, 
was a legal consultant for the Weirton Rank-and-File Committee. He is the author 
of several books, including The Fight Against Shutdowns {Singlejack Books, 1982). 
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"National isn't offering to sell to the workers just because 
it wants to be a good neighbor; employee ownership is 
certainly the most attractive alternative," says an attorney 
Weirton Steel's pension liabilities, he suggests, probably 
would discourage many private buyers. 
National Steel's unfunded pension liabilities—the gap 
between a pension fund's assets and the estimated value of 
pension benefits accrued by employees—totaled $209 million 
last year. Weirton's portion of that is thought to be sizable 
because the facility accounts for more than a third of 
National's total employment and because the average 
Weirton worker has been on the job 20 years, far longer than 
other National employees. 
Any owner of Weirton Steel also will face roughly $500 
million in capital-spending requirements over the next five 
years, including at least $150 million to meet federal air-
quality standards. Weirton's limited growth prospects—half 
its output is tin plate used by container makers, a mature 
market under assault by plastics and aluminum suppliers— 
also reduces its allure. . . ."l 
Still other reasons that the nation's largest-ever worker 
ownership project happened at Weirton have to do with the history 
of that town and its labor force. Weirton is a company town, 
founded in 1909 by Ernest T. Weir. Its union, the Independent 
Steelworkers Union (ISU), is a company union that has never been 
on strike. 
The "Joint Study Committee" and 
the Rank and File Committee 
Within 24 hours of National's announcement, Weirton 
management met with officers of the ISU to establish a so-called 
Joint Study Committee (JSC). The JSC included the entire union 
executive committee, and for this reason, had a nominal union 
majority. But there was never any doubt that the JSC was inspired 
and controlled by management. Workers were informed of the 
JSC's existence by letter from J.G. Redline, president of the Weirton 
Steel division. Mr. Redline himself was the JSC's first chairperson. 
The JSC's address was the company's address. 
On March 23 and 24, 1982, the ISU conducted meetings at St. 
Johns Arena in nearby Steubenville, Ohio, to inform union 
members about the proposed buyout. Richard Arrango, then 
president of the ISU, proposed at these meetings that $500,000 
from the union's Strike and Defense Fund be used to pay for a 
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feasibility study. The membership first voted the proposal down 
and then, in a second vote, approved it. 
Using this half million dollars, the JSC hired a consultant, 
McKinsey & Company, to do a feasibility study. Other consultants 
were hired to develop other facets of the buyout proposal, notably 
the New York City investment firm, Lazard Freres. 
Meantime, a Weirton Steel Rank and File Committee formed. 
Its nucleus was a group of black steelworkers who, with the help 
of local Legal Services lawyers, had resisted race discrimination 
both in the mill and in the community. This group included: Willie 
McKenzie, a foreman, who started a massive class action against 
Weirton's discriminatory employment practices; John Gregory, 
who protested the exclusion of laid-off workers from decisions 
about the future of the mill; and, Tony Gilliam, who became one 
of the Committee's co-chairpersons. White rank-and-filers active 
from the beginning included Steve Paesani, laid-off from nearby 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, and Steve Bauman, who became the 
other chairperson of the Committee. Gilliam and Bauman had 
each worked about ten years in the basic oxygen furnace. They 
are savvy, solid, articulate leaders. Assisting the steelworkers on 
the Committee were the Legal Services lawyers from Steubenville, 
myself, a graduate student in business administration, a law 
student, and two filmmakers. 
It was obvious at all times that a majority of Weirton 
steelworkers would support any proposal to continue operation 
of the mill, no matter how undemocratic the buyout process, no 
matter how great or unnecessary the concessions demanded, and 
no matter how adverse these arrangements were to the interests 
of steelworkers nationwide. Moreover, the Rank and File 
Committee (unlike some of the older workers in the mill, who were 
mostly concerned about pensions, severance pay, and other 
benefits) wanted to see the mill keep running. The posture of the 
Rank and File Committee, therefore, was not to oppose the buyout 
outright, but to ask questions and to insist on a more democratic 
procedure. 
The following were the principal issues raised by the Rank and 
File Committee in the course of its 18-month agitation: 
1. The Right to Know. In the words of the first plank in the 
Committee's April 1982 program: "Members of the community 
and all employees of Weirton Steel have the right to be informed 
of all current negotiations, so that the employees and the 
community may have responsible input into the decisions which 
will be made in their behalf." 
2. The Right of All Affected Workers to Vote on the Buyout 
Plan 
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Plan. The April 1982 program of the Rank and File declared: 
"Weirton Steel employees must have the right to a final vote on 
the employee takeover plan before it is implemented. This includes 
laid-off Weirton Steel employees." At informational meetings in 
July 1982 representatives of the ISU and various JSC consultants 
stated that there would be no vote on the proposed buyout. Several 
speakers said that there couldn't be a vote because "it is a matter 
of individual rights." In early August the Rank and File Committee 
circulated fliers and petitions calling for a vote on the proposed 
wage and benefit cuts. Later that month the JSC and ISU reversed 
themselves and announced that there would be a vote on the 
proposed cuts. In the end, laid-off workers were allowed to take 
part in the vote. 
3. The Right to an Equal Voice in Running the New 
Company. Rank and File Committee literature emphasized the 
need for employees to have voting rights over the stock of the new 
company whether that stock was directly owned by employees 
or held in a trust. The Committee also demanded decisionmak-
ing on the basis of one person, one vote, regardless of the amount 
of stock owned. 
These and other demands (particularly for a pension separate 
from the ESOP) were projected in a series of fliers. Billboards 
around town proclaimed, "We Can Do It!" The Rank and File 
raised the voting issue in a flier headed, "Who Is The 'We' In 'We 
Can Do It?" When the McKinsey study proposed a 32% reduction 
in compensation, the Rank and File asked: "If A Doctor Wants 
to Cut Off 32% Of Your Arm, Wouldn't You Ask For A Second 
Opinion?" The Committee's last effort, demanding to see the six-
year collective bargaining agreement that was part of the final 
buyout package, was captioned, "Oh, Say Can You See?" 
Scabbing On the Class: The 32% Reduction 
The much-heralded feasibility study by McKinsey & Company 
was released at the end of July 1982. It had one major 
recommendation. The study's "executive summary" read as 
follows (emphasis in original). 
[T]o succeed Weirton must: 
• Reduce compensation for all employees—wages, salaries, 
incentives, and benefits paid to union and management 
personnel—by 20 percent. 
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• Further reduce compensation for all employees by an 
additional 12 percent for no more than 4 years to build the 
equity base that is requred to obtain short-term financing for 
capital investments. 
. . . this total 32% reduction is relative to current compensation 
of other steel workers; should other steel workers agree to lower 
their compensation, Weirton must follow. 
The union officers immediately announced that they supported 
the recommended 32% reduction. The Rank and File Committee 
raised the question, "On what data and calculations is the 
recommendation based?" 
Close reading of the text of the feasibility study revealed that 
just at those points where the argument seemed to call for a full 
explanation of how the 32% was derived, the study invoked a 
mysterious, not-yet-released Confidential Appendix. 
Not suprisingly, representatives of the Rank and File Committee 
asked to see this Confidential Appendix. They were contemptuously 
refused, and brought suit, alleging that the right to a vote under 
the Landrum-Griffin Act meant the right to an informed vote. This 
suit was a legal failure in that the Court denied access to the 
Confidential Appendix. Practically, however, the suit produced the 
following results: 
1. At a hearing in November 1982, President Walter Bish of the 
Independent Steelworkers Union testified that, although the ISU 
had paid $500,000 from its strike fund for the feasibility study, 
neither he nor any other officer of the union had ever seen the 
Confidential Appendix. The only copies of the Confidential 
Appendix turned out to be in New York City, at the offices of 
McKinsey & Company, who wrote it (and who may have wished 
to resell its contents as many times as possible); Lazard Freres, 
the investment bankers hired by the JSC as financial consultants; 
and Willkie Farr & Gallagher, the law firm hired by the JSC as 
legal consultants. 
2. Following the November 1982 hearing, several documents 
conceded by President Bish at the hearing to be in the union's 
possession were released to the membership. These included: an 
analysis of the assets and liabilities of the National Steel pension 
fund; an analysis of labor costs by the union's accountant and a 
description of the proposed ESOP structure. 
3. In March 1983, two things happened. The United Steelworkers 
of America agreed to massive concessions in their Basic Steel 
Contract amounting to a reduction in compensation of approx-
ai&idl t i i^^^#«- . . -
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Weirton employees should have become 32 plus 9, or 41%. But 
the very opposite occured. Following negotiations with National 
Steel for the purchase of the plant, the ISU and its consultants 
announced that it would only be necessary to reduce the 
compensation of Weirton workers by approximately 20%. 
This announcement revealed the spurious character of the 
original proposed 32% reduction in compensation. The figure 
appears to have been, not a financial estimate, but a political 
judgement of how much the traffic would bear, of how much could 
be extracted from Weirton workers. Thanks to the agitation of the 
Rank and File Committee, the proposed reduction was itself 
reduced by more than a third. 
Was any reduction justified, and if so, how much? Weirton had 
historically paid its workers about 10% more than the 
compensation provided by the Basic Steel Contract, in order to 
avoid unionization by the USWA. The union's accountant 
estimated the hourly employment cost of Weirton steelworkers 
on April 1, 1982 as $24.91 an hour. The American Iron and Steel 
Institute publishes a monthly report which provides the hourly 
employment cost of all steelworkers. In April 1982 that figure was 
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$22.63 an hour. In April 1982 the Weirton steelworker was paid 
about 9% more than his/her counterpart in basic steel. 
Accordingly, the Rank and File Committee took the position that 
a 10% reduction in compensation was acceptable, but any further 
reduction would be scabbing on brothers and sisters covered by 
the Basic Steel Contract. 
David Moberg of In These Times reported the reaction of 
Weirton union leaders. Moberg asked them whether they were 
not concerned "to stop the immense wage cuts which have an 
effect on all steel workers." 
"No," David Robertson, attorney for the union, answers. 
"It's an independent union and I think you find there's no 
such feeling of solidarity." Besides, he notes, nearby 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel with USW representation, has 
taken large wage cuts in exchange for stock. 
"If there is going to be one domestic steel company alive 
in this country, we intend it to be Weirton," union president 
Bish said. "I don't feel bad about undercutting them," union 
officer and Joint Study Committee member Emil Morelli 
said, "if that's what we're doing. We're stockholders. That's 
the way big business is. I'll be an equal owner of a big 
business."2 
The End Of Equal Voting Rights 
From the beginning, the Rank and File Commitee demanded 
that each employee of the new company have an equal say in 
running it. The Rank and File Committee program of April 1982 
stated: 
To insure democracy in the operation of the new company 
and participation on the part of all employees in the decision 
making process, both on the shop floor and in the board 
rooms, we propose that all employees have an equal vote. 
That is, one person, one vote, regardless of the amount of 
stock one can afford. 
For a time, it seemed that the JSC consultants intended to 
embrace this proposal. On October 29, 1982, the three 
consultants—Lazard Freres & Company (financial), Willkie Farr 
& Gallagher (legal), and Ludwig & Curtis (ESOP structure)—wrote 
a joint letter "to the employees of Weirton Steel" enclosing an 
outline of the proposed ESOP structure. Because of its simplistic 
style this document came to be known in rank-and-file circles as 
, . „ . , - . , , - , , . , - ^ ^ WL* . _ _ 
Buy-Out at Weirton Steel 49 
eelworker was paid 
basic steel, 
ook the position that 
able, but any further 
d sisters covered by 
ted the reaction of 
whether they were 
cuts which have an 
e union, answers. 
DU find there's no 
le notes, nearby 
presentation, has 
ock. 
tel company alive 
," union president 
ttingthem," union 
iber Emil Morelli 
)ckholders. That's 
d owner of a big 
"the comic book." Nevertheless, the document was quite explicit 
in endorsing the principle of equal allocation of the new company's 
stock: 
We recommend that each year every employee get an equal 
amount of the total stock allocated because: 
— A 32% cut is just as rough for a laborer as it is for the highest 
paid person in the company, and 
— Everyone's sacrifice is essential to make Weirton work. 
Although other ESOPs allocate stock based on formulas 
involving compensation, seniority or other factors, we think 
equal allocation is fairest and best. 
In summer 1983 this proposal was quietly abandoned. On July 
5, the three consultants addressed a memorandum, not to each 
employee, but to the members of the JSC, entitled, "ESOP 
Structure: Allocation of Stock, Distribution of Stock, and Voting 
Rights." The memorandum stated in part: 
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We originally recommended that each year every employee 
should receive an equal amount of the total stock 
allocated. . . . [Now] we think Weirton should allocate stock 
in proportion to compensation. 
This critical change was never highlighted for union members. 
Decision making in the new Weirton Steel is further affected 
by the ESOP's provisions for distribution of stock, and voting. The 
ESOP provides that no distribution of stock (that is, of stock 
allocated to the accounts of individual employees as the ESOP loan 
is repaid) may take place for five years. According to the July 1983 
memorandum the reason for this is "to preserve the independence 
of the Board of Directors." Moreover, the possibility of distribution 
after five years involves a Catch 22. According to the 
memorandum, "Weirton will not be able to afford full 
distribution. . .unless Weirton stock can be sold to people other 
than employees of the Weirton ESOP" by converting the stock of 
the new company to a public stock issue. But conversion of 
Weirton's stock to a public issue would inevitably dilute ownership 
of shares, and destroy the last vestige of worker control of the 
corporation. Accordingly it can be anticipated that in about 1988 
workers at Weirton will face the following cruel choice: In order 
to obtain the stock allocated to their individual accounts, workers 
will have to agree to give up control; but if they insist on retaining 
control, they may not be able to exchange their shares for cash. 
The consultants defend the presentation of this choice to 
employees because they provide that this particular vote (unlike 
routine decisions of the corporation) would be decided not by the 
Board of Directors, but on a "one man, one vote" basis. 
I consider this rhetoric demagogic. It is inevitable that all but 
a handful of workers, if forced to choose between their economic 
interest and a very attenuated form of control of the company, 
will opt for ready cash. The Weirton consultants state in the July 
1983 memorandum: "When Weirton employees vote on this issue 
[of whether to 'go public'], we would recommend that they 
approve public ownership." The fact is that the consultants have 
cynically structured the process so that employees will have little 
practical choice except to approve a public stock issue. 
Worker Ownership a la Wall Street 
On September 23, 1983, the proposed buyout was approved by 
an overwhelming majority of 89% of those voting. Voters also 
approved a six-year labor contract prohibiting strikes and wage 
adjustments for that period of time. (The Rank and File Committee 
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3e | unsuccessfully sought to have the full text of the proposed contract 
^ made available to members before the vote.) 
^ By the time the vote was taken, the leadership of the new 
company was in place. Robert L. Loughhead resigned as president 
of Copperweld Steel in Warren, Ohio, to become president of 
k e r s Weirton Steel at $250,000 a year. Weirton Steel's Board of Directors 
,ctec[ included management representatives, labor representatives, and 
Tkg a majority of six so-called "independent" representatives. 
•tock The "independent" representatives are: Herbert Elish, a senior 
l o a n vice president of International Paper Co., formerly vice president 
^933 of Citibank and executive director of New York City's Municipal 
e n c e Assistance Corporation; Gordon Hurlbert, a member of the 
l t i o n management committee of Westinghouse Electric Company Power 
the Systems, a Westinghouse subsidiary; Lawrence Isaacs, former 
full chief financial officer of Federated Department Stores Inc. and 
>ther Allis Chalmers Corporation; F. James Rechin, group vice president 
: k 0f and general manager of the Aircraft Components Group of TRW 
,n 0f Inc.; Richard F. Schubert, president of the American Red Cross 
rship and former vice chairman and president of Bethlehem Steel 
f the Corporation; and Phillip H. Smith, formerly chairman and chief 
1938 executive of Copperweld Corporation.3 
)rcler I n July 1984, the Associated Press checked out the largest 
rk e r s worker-owned firm in the United States and reported: 
ming 
: ash. The nation's largest experiment in employee ownership 
: e to hasn't erased the invisible line between labor and 
nlike management at Weirton Steel, despite a public relations 
Y the campaign depicting the workers as their own bosses. 
1 bu t The story continued: 
omic 
) a n v "The relationships between managment and the union 
j u iy have not changed," says union officer Craig Petrella. "Yes, 
[ssue they do listen. Yes, they do talk a lot. But all we're getting 
they right now is lip service." 
have F e w stories of the recession-ravaged U.S. steel industry 
little have received as much national attention as the Weirton 
workers' Employee Stock Ownership Plan, which headed off 
near-certain closing of the massive mill. 
Many of the accounts have conjured up images of sweat-
id by drenched steelworkers occupying corporate boardrooms, 
also I taking control of the company that once controlled most of 
wage the lives in this company town, 
littee ! But many of the "7,000 heroes" of Weirton Steel, as the 
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workers were described by one of the New York bankers who 
helped put the deal together, don't see any change in the 
traditional adversary relationship between labor and 
management. 
The AP found that "most workers felt they had no choice—the 
original owner, National Steel Corp., was determined to unload 
the mill." Union officer Petrella commented that many laid-off 
workers had been rehired, but that even more should be working. 
"They're doing more work with fewer people," according to 
Petrella. "Where three people used to do a job, I think two people 
are doing it." Petrella also told the AP that workers were being 
told to do things "twice as fast as it's normally done," and that 
quality was suffering as a result. 
Charles Cronin, the mill's public relations director (as he was 
for the old company), responded that combining jobs is a part of 
management's plan to "fine-tune" the plant and make it more 
profitable. But Christy Graziani, a 25-year employee, says that 
many employees don't feel like owners: "They think they've been 
asked to give too much already, with little in return." 
Concluding Note 
Readers who want more information about "worker ownership" 
at Weirton may be interested in: 
• An article by Jonathan Prude entitled "ESOP's Fable," appearing 
in Number 78 of Socialist Review (3202 Adeline Street, Berkeley, 
California 94703). 
• A new movie, The Great Weirton Steed by Robert Machover and 
Catherine Pozzo diBorgo, from First Run Features (153 Waverly 
Place, New York, New York 10014). 
Both "ESOP's Fable" and The Great Weirton Sfefi share the 
fundamental point-of-view of this article. 
A Pittsburgh-based group, the TriState Conference on Steel, has 
developed an alternative approach to the reindustrialization of the 
steel industry. Its critical features are: 1) reliance on government 
grants or government-guaranteed loans, 2) local management by 
workers or a combination of workers and community represen-
tatives, and 3) use of government's eminent domain power to 
acquire abandoned or under-utilized facilties. This program is set 
forth in a pamphlet, Rebuild Steel: A Program to Reconstruct 
American Industry, available for $1 from the TriState Conference 
on Steel (Box 315, Homestead, Pennsylvania 15120). 
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The United Steelworkers of America has endorsed the TWState 
approach for the Monongahela Valley, where, at this writing, the 
struggle centers on whether United States Steel will be permitted 
to destroy a new Basic Oxygen Process shop and blast furnace 
at its Duquesne Works. • 
Notes 
1
 Thomas F. O'Boyle, "Planned Sale of Steel Plants Brings Hope to One Ohio 
River Town, Fear to Another," Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1982. 
2
 David Moberg, "At Weirton Steel, It's Buy It Or Lose It," In These Times, 
December 15-21, 1982. 
3
 "6 Picked for ESOP," Wheeling Intelligencer, July 14, 1983. 
The Great Weirton Steel 
Produced by 
Robert Machover 
Directed by 
Catherine Pozzo di Borgo 
55 minutes, color 
16 mm and video 
The Great Weirton Ste%l Classroom rental: $100 
is unique among Purchase—16 mm: $850 
documentaries about the Video: $500 
current depression in 
America's heartland 
because not only does it 
let people speak for 
themselves, but it shows for domestic distribution contact: 
the human cost of 
'miracle' remedies and 
leaves us few illusions 
that there are easy 
m* 
H H I I DUN FEATURE! 
answers." 153 Waverly Place 
Stanley Aronowitz, N e w Y o r k> N Y 1 0 0 1 4 
author of Working Class Hero ® 212/243-0600 
